Abstract
Introduction
As the sustainability of public services in most Member States has become an increasingly fraught political issue in the last decades, 1 numerous Member States have reconsidered their domestic rules governing access to public services, including health care services. 2 In the UK, the immigration social assistance system" of the host State and "sickness insurance in respect of all risks" in the host State. 7 As is typical of directives, the wording of these requirements is general enough so as to be adaptable to the specific legal situation in each Member State. The requirement for "sickness insurance in respect of all risks", however, was never clarified in secondary legislation or in guidance. "All risks"
was an absolute requirement, and one that ignored that national healthcare systems supplied different levels of coverage. In countries where there was both basic and supplementary cover available, it is unclear which of these was required.
8 Uncertainty surrounding what constitutes appropriate "sickness insurance" has not diminished with the advent of the Citizens' Directive. "Comprehensive" is possibly a less stringent requirement than "all risks", but it is not a significant clarification. This remains problematic, because the requirement for "sickness insurance" has to be applied by national authorities in such a way so that economically inactive migrants and their families can demonstrate that they possess it.
9
To date, EU secondary legislation has not specified the level of coverage needed by the requirement, nor has the ECJ's case law offered clarification. In Baumbast, the ECJ confirmed that both the "sickness insurance" requirement and the "sufficient resources" requirement are included in the Directive to prevent economically inactive migrants who "become an 'unreasonable' burden on the 5 public finances of the host Member State" from exercising a right to reside. 10 Following this, the ECJ held that any limitations on the right to reside must be proportionate. 11 In the case in question, Mr.
Baumbast had medical insurance in Germany, but this insurance did not cover emergency care in the UK. The ECJ held that denying Mr. Baumbast residency rights on this lack of coverage would be disproportionate.
12
Baumbast helps formulate a notion of comprehensive sickness insurance: the phrasing of the 1990s
Directives may have demanded "insurance against all risks", but the ECJ in Baumbast made it clear host States cannot require economically inactive EU migrants to demonstrate literal compliance with this requirement. 13 It is likely that the Citizens' Directive's amended requirement for simply "comprehensive" sickness insurance is a response to this need to consider proportionality.
However, Baumbast cannot be taken to mean that all private insurance, regardless of coverage levels, is "comprehensive" sickness insurance. Complete clarity thus cannot be extracted from this case any more than from the amended requirement in the Citizens' Directive.
Only recently has the Commission offered guidance on how to interpret the requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance. 20 This line of case law has been longdiscussed in the academic literature, frequently critically so. 21 The fact that the NHS had no financial 9 mechanism in place to reimburse treatment abroad given that no "payment" for treatment ever took place domestically was swept aside by the ECJ, which on that point simply stated that "the need for the Member States to reconcile the principles and broad scheme of their healthcare system with the requirements arising from the Community freedoms entails … a duty on the part of the competent authorities of a national health service, such as the NHS, to provide mechanisms for the reimbursement of the cost of hospital treatment in another Member State". Given that all EU Member States first coordinating social security operated a social insurance model welfare State, it is plausible that current-day terms used in EU secondary legislation to refer to healthcare policy within Member States are rooted in that tradition as well.
35
Under the national health service model, however, citizens are not insured against illness, but rather benefit from universal coverage by a State-funded healthcare system. These types of public healthcare systems do not collect individual contributions through employment, as insurance-based models do, but rather are funded indirectly through taxation in a variety of ways. In practical operation, many parts of such a national health system are transaction-free. Whereas in a social insurance system, insurance providers and citizens directly communicate about the cost of treatment and the general contribution to the health-care system the citizen must make on an annual basis, in a national health service system, citizens benefit from treatment that is "free at the point of use", as no payment visibly exchanges hands from the patient to the care provider.
36
As discussed, the precise meaning of healthcare "insurance" has not been addressed by the EU legislators or the ECJ, although the Commission issued a reasoned opinion to the UK The Commission thus appears to view the NHS as a comprehensive sickness insurance provider despite the fact that it does not provide insurance. This classification has significant repercussions in light of how entitlement to treatment under the NHS (and other national health services) is normally organized.
NHS Entitlement
The relevant provisions on entitlement to treatment by the NHS in England are set out in the NHS her to NHS treatment free of charge. The requirement for "comprehensive sickness insurance" would thus appear automatically satisfied for nearly all EU migrants intending to live in the UK.
44
Coverage for "Overseas Visitors"
The NHS access rights conundrum is exacerbated by the UK rules which permit recovery of NHS healthcare costs, which are laid down in the NHS (Charging of Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011.
While there is an argument to be made that economically inactive EU citizens should not be able to pass an "ordinary residence" test unless they are not reliant on the NHS (and thus not burdening UK public funds), domestic regulation makes free healthcare explicitly available for "exempt" overseas visitors in nearly all situations that would cover economically inactive EU migration.
First of all, the NHS (Charging of Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011 exempt all students registered on a substantially State-funded degree course lasting for more than 6 months from NHS charges. In conclusion, under domestic UK law on health-care access, all economically inactive EU citizens are entitled to free NHS treatment after having resided in the UK for twelve months. In the case of students enrolled in a degree that lasts longer than 6 months, the entitlement begins on the day they arrive to study.
UK Implementation and Application of EU Law

UK Interpretations of Directive 2004/38 and Comprehensive Sickness Insurance
To compensate for the very generous "free NHS health care for residents" legislation in force in the UK, the UK authority charged with supplying EU residency documentation (UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI)) holds that entitlement to the NHS does not equate to having "comprehensive sickness insurance".
The UK has implemented the Citizens' Directive through the Immigration (European Economic Area) 51 Citizens' Directive, arts. 4 and 5 provide rights to exit and entry, and arts. 6, 7, and 16 provide the rights to reside for up to three months, between three months and five years, and permanently.
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UKVI has made available its working definition of "comprehensive sickness insurance" in Modernised
Guidance on "how it considers the free movement rights" of EU citizens, 52 as well as in instructions to UKVI "caseworkers" processing EU applications. 53 The Casework Instructions indicate that three possible documents can be included as proof of sickness insurance: first, home State coverage-as evidenced by the EHIC or Forms S1, S2 or S3-will suffice as proof of comprehensive sickness insurance for those in the UK on a temporary basis. In addition, the UKBA will consider a private health insurance policy document as proof of comprehensive sickness insurance if it will cover the EU citizen for "medical treatment in the majority of circumstances" during their stay in the UK.
54
The Modernised Guidance states the following with regards to "comprehensive sickness Buxton LJ followed this up with a second argument as to why NHS entitlement does not equate to "sickness insurance":
"It is also because of the nature of the NHS that the social security payments currently being made by W do not count as "insurance" for these purposes. The NHS scheme is not financed solely out of the social security scheme, but is largely tax-financed. Contribution to the social security fund cannot therefore serve as any sort of proxy for insurance designed to remove from the taxpayer the burden of providing health care."
67
In short, Buxton LJ did not dispute that the NHS is a health care provider, but stressed that it was not a health care insurer. The nature of its funding and its regulation of access means that reliance on the NHS runs anathema to the Directive's purpose in requiring comprehensive sickness insurance in the first place: to prevent the UK finances from being 'unreasonably burdened' by economically inactive EU citizens. Consequently, he ruled that W and X had not satisfied the "sickness insurance" requirement, and thus did not have a right to reside in the UK on the basis of EU law. observation. In the reasoned opinion it has sent to the UK, the Commission appears to follow this position as well. 74 The emphasis on entitlement in its opinion suggests that it finds that if economically inactive EU migrants are permitted to access the NHS under domestic law, such permission equates to having "comprehensive sickness insurance" cover in the UK.
Whereas UKVI and Buxton LJ focus on the Directive's requirement of insurance so as to preclude an unreasonable public burden from being created on the UK, the Commission appears to have commenced infringement proceedings on the basis that the requirement for "comprehensive 
Possibilities for Excluding Economically Inactive EU Citizens from the NHS
Denying the Right to Reside: 'Unreasonable Burden'
The UK is not the only country that is struggling with EU migrant access to a national health system in the post-citizenship EU; for instance, Valcke observes similar problems in Spain and France. 76 The 75 Barker, "Britain falls foul of Brussels over immigration". State-are not contributing to the NHS, but entitled to use it for free all the same.
77
The ECJ's case law has historically respected that free movement has significant consequences for the financing of public services in the Member States, and that these consequences are potentially particularly severe for Member States that grant access to social benefits on the basis of residence.
The EU's social security coordination regulations reflect these concerns; Regulation 883/2004's provisions on sickness and healthcare benefits require that where a pensioner collects a pension in one Member State and resides in another Member State, it is the State where the pensioner was economically active that will bear the cost of the healthcare provided in the State of residence. 78 In
Rundgren, the ECJ discusses the operation of these coordination rules and notes that they exist to prevent "penalising" Member States that grant social security benefits on the basis of residence.
79
However, the Regulation manages to effectively coordinate responsibility for extending healthcare benefits for pensioners largely because pensioners were workers at one time, and consequently have paid contributions to at least one social security system. What of the economically inactive, who are either too young to have contributed-as will be true for many students-or, for any other For such migrants, it is exclusively host State domestic law that determines if they are entitled to access public healthcare systems. In the case of a health care system that operates on a social insurance basis, the EU migrant will be able to buy participation in the system on equivalent grounds to all national residents as well as all economically active EU migrant residents. 80 In a health care
system that operates on a residency basis alone, however, there is no option for "buying" access.
National law such as that of the UK simply grants access. In recognition of this, the Citizenship Directive permits Member States to declare economically inactive EU migrants to be an "unreasonable burden" if they rely on the benefits to which they are legally entitled to an "unreasonable" extent. Being declared such a burden would then deprive them of a right to reside in the host State. 81 Additionally, the Citizenship Directive excludes certain types of benefits from its equal treatment principle, largely because they would pose an 'unreasonable burden'; an example that has been subject to much case law is study financing, which does not have to be extended to migrant EU students until they have obtained permanent residence, per art. 24 (2) An alternative solution to the problem outlined above would be to change domestic access entitlements to the NHS so that economically inactive EU migrants no longer can rely on the NHS.
However, this is likely to lead to other difficulties, as EU law indirectly but significantly impacts how access to the NHS can be regulated.
Restricting Entitlement to the NHS: Equal Treatment and 'Real Links'
If the UK wishes to restrict the NHS care entitlement of economically inactive EU migrants, it must find means of doing so that do not violate EU law. This is made difficult by the art. 18 TFEU prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality, given particular context for EU citizens by the equal treatment right articulated in art. 24 of the Citizens' Directive. 95 Art. 18 TFEU forbids discrimination on the grounds of nationality (de jure or de facto) insofar as an area of domestic law is within the EU Treaties' material scope, albeit with several exceptions found in secondary legislation:
as noted, student maintenance grants are potentially excluded by art. 24(2) of the Citizens' Directive, as is "social assistance" within the first three months of residing in a host State. In the ECJ's view, "social assistance" in art. 24 therefore refers to publicly funded assistance that migrants become dependent upon because they lack sufficient resources. NHS access, however, is not a resource-dependent or means-tested benefit; it cannot be "paid for" even by those who do have sufficient resources to not burden the public finances of the UK. Under the Brey definition, access to the NHS is not a form of "social assistance". 98 If NHS entitlement is not deemed to be "social assistance", withdrawing access rights for economically inactive EU migrants is impermissible under EU law, both in the first three months of residence and in the subsequent years. Art. 24(1) of the Citizens' Directive and Article 4 of positions. Thus, if every economically inactive UK national has a right to use the NHS on account of residing in the UK, every economically inactive EU national resident in the UK would similarly be entitled; any alternative would be discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.
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The ECJ has, however, recognised that granting access to publicly funded social security to all economically inactive EU migrants may make domestic social security systems unsustainable. It has therefore held that it is permissible for Member States to restrict access to benefits only to those migrants who can demonstrate a "real link" or a "genuine link" to the host State. 100 The concept of a "real link" was introduced in D'Hoop, and has since been applied by the ECJ in cases where Member
States wish to justify restrictions on social security benefits. In doing so, the ECJ has held that "the proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too exclusive in nature or unduly favour one element which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the claimant and the Member State..." 101 Additionally, in Commission v Austria, the ECJ stressed that "the genuine link required … need not be fixed in a uniform matter for all benefits, but should be established according to the constitutive elements of the benefit in question." 102 How would such a "real link" look with regards to NHS access as the benefit in question?
The first difficulty of a "real link" test is that it, too, requires a proportionate examination of the circumstances of any particular applicant. The ECJ's suggested approaches to such an examination 99 On this reasoning, see Iliopoulou and Toner, "Case Note: Grzelczyk" (2002) Conversely, the ECJ's guidance to national authorities suggests that a "reasonable period" of residence may demonstrate a "real link". 106 However, Stewart makes it clear that requiring a "reasonable period" of residence would nonetheless violate the proportionality principle, as it excludes all other possible means by which a claimant could demonstrate a connection to the host State. 107 The difficulties inherent to a "real link" investigation are thus are similar to those produced by the "unreasonable burden" test outlined above: proving that there is no genuine link would require the UK, at significant cost, to consider all possible relevant indicators of connectedness in an economically inactive EU migrant's life.
There are additional problems with only entitling economically active EU migrants with "real links"
to NHS access, and these stem from the fact that a non-discriminatory version of such a test will negatively affect migrant UK nationals. 
